WHAT WE DO?

Our mainly products were globe valve,angle valve,gate valve,SDNR valve,check valve,hose valve,storm valve,butterfly valve,air vent head,strainer tec, according to DIN,JIS,ANSI,API,BS,GB,CB,CBM,AS standard. Material is including cast iron,ductile iron,cast steel,cast bronze,forged brass,stainless steel,forge steel,and can be extensively used in marine,petroleum,chemical, metallurgical,electric power,architectural,agriculture field.

WHAT WE DO?

OUR VALVE PACKING

We have our own packing worshop and workman to tailored packages according to the product.All of our valves were packing carefully by plywood cases,to avoid damage when transportation by air,by sea,or by courier.

OUR VALVE PACKING

OUR STORAGE

Our warehouse area was more than 2000 square meters with large ex-stock valves including gate valves,globe valves,butterfly valves ,bronze vavles and air vent head,to meet the demand of customer's spot requirement.This make us save the time to prepare order and provide the customer faster delivery.

OUR STORAGE

PRODUCT PROCESSING

We have more than 120 product processing staffs,including 24 senior engineers&12 R&D engineers,Moreover,We have well-working machining equipments and inpsection equipments for vavles.That make sure we could processing the high-quality valves.

PRODUCT PROCESSING

Human Error a Factor in Both US Navy Collisions

2017-11-03 15:30:34

Human Error a Factor in Both US Navy Collisions

Image Courtesy: US Navy

Investigations into two separate collisions involving US Navy vessels have revealed that multiple failures by watch standers contributed to the incidents.

The navy released a report on November 1 detailing the events and actions that led to the collision of USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) and Philippine-flagged containership ACX Crystal, operated by Japan’s NYK Line, off the coast of Japan June 17, and the collision of USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) and Liberian-flagged tanker Alnic MC on August 21.

“Both of these accidents were preventable and the respective investigations found multiple failures by watch standers that contributed to the incidents,” Adm. John Richardson, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), said.

The report showed that the collision between Fitzgerald and Crystal was avoidable and resulted from an accumulation of smaller errors over time, “ultimately resulting in a lack of adherence to sound navigational practices.”

Specifically, Fitzgerald’s watch teams disregarded established norms of basic contact management and, more importantly, leadership failed to adhere to well-established protocols put in place to prevent collisions. In addition, the ship’s triad was absent during an evolution where their experience, guidance and example would have greatly benefited the ship.

The second collision, between John S. McCain and Alnic MC, was also avoidable and resulted primarily from complacency, over-confidence and lack of procedural compliance, the US Navy said.

A major contributing factor to the collision was sub-standard level of knowledge regarding the operation of the ship control console. In particular, McCain’s commanding officer disregarded recommendations from his executive officer, navigator and senior watch officer to set sea and anchor watch teams in a timely fashion to ensure the safe and effective operation of the ship.

With regard to procedures, no one on the Bridge watch team, to include the commanding officer and executive officer, were properly trained on how to correctly operate the ship control console during a steering casualty, according to the report.

These collisions, along with other similar incidents over the past year, indicated a need for the Navy to undertake a review of wider scope to better determine systemic causes. The navy’s completed its Comprehensive Review of Surface Fleet Incidents on October 23, 2017.